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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and 4 44 7
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General
Partnership, by and through its
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT,
Case No. 90391
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
vs.
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a
Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC. , a
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ;
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON,
Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah
Constitution Art. VIII, § 3; Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl.
Vol. 1987); and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.
Did the lower court properly hold that Overthrust Oil &
Gas Corporation was not an accommodation party to the $1 million
note executed by Capitol Thrift & Loan Company?
mixed question of fact and law.

This issue is a

The question whether Overthrust

was an accommodation party is an issue of fact (since it depends
on the intent of the parties) and this Court should defer to the
finding of the trial court unless the finding was clearly

erroneous as against the clear weight of the evidence.
Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).

Doelle v.

The issue whether, as

a matter of law, a trustor of a trust deed can be an
accommodation party to the maker of the underlying instrument is
an issue of law and this Court need accord no deference to the
ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness.
Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989).
II.
Did the lower court properly dismiss appellants' crossclaim against Richard A. Christenson?

This is an issue is a

mixed question of law and fact, governed by the standard set
forth in the previous paragraph.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal by Overthrust Oil & Gas Corporation

and Faust Land, Inc., from a judgment of the lower court entered
on March 30, 1990, dismissing their cross-claims against Richard
A. Christenson with prejudice and on the merits.
B.

(R. 441. )

QJSPQSition gf thq Cage Belgw.
The action was tried before the Honorable Homer F.

Wilkinson, of the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele
County, on August 31, 1989.

Following the trial, the Court made

its findings of fact and conclusions of law orally on the record.
(Transcript of Memorandum Decision, September 7, 1989.)
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The

court entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
October 23, 1989.

(R. 339-48. )

Following objections from

appellants, the court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on December 29, 1989.

(R. 401-06).

After

hearing further objections from appellants, the court entered
Superseding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 423-37)
together with a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (R. 438-44) on
March 30, 1989.

Appellants have appealed from the Judgment and

Decree of Foreclosure entered March 30, 1989.

(R. 473-74. )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Zions First National Bank made a loan to Capitol Thrift
& Loan Company ("Capitol Thrift") on September 28, 1984, for
$1,000,000.00 (the "$1 million note").

The loan was guaranteed

by defendant Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson").

In

connection with the restructuring of all of the indebtedness owed
by Capitol Thrift and others to plaintiffs, on May 26, 1986,
Overthrust Oil & Gas Corporation ("Overthrust") executed a Trust
Deed as additional security for the loan on approximately 3, 500
acres of property located in Tooele County.

(Finding of Fact No.

4, R. 434. )
On September 30, 1987, plaintiffs Zions First National
Bank and 4447 Associates entered into an Agreement with defendant
Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") and other parties by which
certain obligations owed to plaintiffs were settled and released.
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The obligations that were released included the $1 million note
executed by Capitol Thrift & Loan Company.

(Finding of Fact No.

12, R. 433; Exhibit D-4. )
Plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action to
foreclose the Trust Deed.

Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc.

("Faust Land") in turn filed a cross-claim against Christenson
seeking a judgment against him for the value of the property that
was the subject of the Trust Deed.

(R. 204. )

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Appellants' brief fails to contain any argument

that the lower court committed error in dismissing the crossclaim against Richard A. Christenson.

Although they conclude

their brief with a request that this Court order that Christenson
is liable, appellants have not articulated their legal argument
and have not cited this Court to those portions of the record
that support their position.

Appellants' brief violates Rule

24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2.

The lower court properly found that Overthrust was

not an accommodation party.

That issue is an issue of fact and

depends on the intent of the parties.

Appellants failed to

marshal the evidence against the court' s finding and failed to
show that that finding was against the clear weight of the
evidence.

In addition, the lower court' s ruling was correct as a

matter of law.

A trustor of a trust deed is not an accommodation

-4g: \wpi\088\00000p44. W51

p a r t y w i t h i n t h e meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(l) (Repl
Vol.

19 90)

•

"instrument"

^

. •'
*

•.

r-ror,

did not sign a n

'ri.: = cefined in the Uniform Commercial

Code, n o r d i d it lend i ts name to * Thri ft & I ioai 1 Compai iy

Pi na 1 ] y

sue Christenson (or Zions and 4447

%

a k e r ~;f :r.e note

0" - • -

:•

Tapitol
* - • .

.ss-^ic^s for m a t :.atit:

because it ] ack standing, having conveyed * -1 Tooele property
prior to the entry of the judgment

; - . . . '

i

evidence that Overthrust was damaged i •: any cr/ r:y zhe
foreclosure of the property.
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS7 BRIEF DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE
THE BASIS FOR THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CHRISTENSON.
In the conclusion to their brief on appeal, Overthrust
and F ' a u s 1: I i a i i c:i a s k 11: :n :i s C o i i i: t: t o r e v e r s e t h e 11: i a ] c o u i: t: a i i d t: o
order that j u d g m e n t should be entered against C h r i s t e n s o n for the
value of '.::>- mineral n g n t s 1 sr and for t h e value of t h e Tooele
Property

""'" -

position

ni'v understandable fashion.

{,, Hlf,y -, -.

-

::n not. howe' ••;:, - - ,.. - i n tl: le basi s f ::: i: thei r
Nowhere i n their brief

\ u n r i s t e n s o n should be liable to them, and

C h r i s t e n s o n ^s a\ =» loss i n knowing h o w to respond to their
claims.

A p p e l l a n t s had t h e s a in e difficulty during the t r i a 1 o f
A p p e l l a n t s ' brief, at 3 7
_c
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this action in articulating the legal basis for their claim that
they were somehow entitled to a judgment against Christenson.
In Point VIII of their brief, which appears to be the
only point that might possibly relate to Christenson, they argue
that they were accommodation parties, but fail to describe the
legal significance of that assertion as it relates to their
claims against Christenson.

Their scattered and disorganized

argument lends no support to their contention that the lower
court committed error in dismissing the cross-claim against
Christenson. 2
If Overthrust and Faust Land believe that Christenson
is liable on a theory of subrogation or for contribution, they
have failed to make their argument in terms that can be
understood and responded to.

Not once in their brief do they

direct this Court to legal authorities or to references in the
record that support their untenable position, and Christenson is
left to hazard guesses regarding the legal basis of their claims.

2

Point VIII of the brief filed by Overthrust and Faust
Land was virtually unintelligible, containing sentences without
verbs and paragraphs that seem entirely meaningless. In Point VIII
they argue consecutively that they were accommodation parties; that
plaintiffs "ought to be estopped" from foreclosing; that an accord
and satisfaction was reached between plaintiffs, Capitol, and
Christenson; and that the debt secured by the Trust Deed was
extinguished.
(Appellants' brief, at 32-35.) Appellants do not
explain the relationship between these various issues, nor do they
state whether these issues have any significance to the question of
Christenson' s alleged
liability.
Their
argument
contains
practically no citations to legal authority or to the record and is
impossible for Christenson to respond to adequately.
-6g:\wpl\088\00000p44. W51

Their appeal as against Christenson shoul< 1 be dismissed for
.-- - - - - Procedure

. ^4(a;(9)/ Utah Rules of Aore'.ate

-::;.<:;; provides t.-is*- the argument section ;;

s

"shall contain the contentions and reasons :-f the appellant with
res pec t: t :::

-• -

•"

•

. • : • . ....^

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on,"j
11.
NEITHER OVERTHRUST NOR FAUST LAND WAS AN
ACCOMMODATION PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH
CODE ANN, § 70A-3-606.
A.

Overthrust and Faust Land have not met their
burden of showing that the lower court/ s
finding of fact that they are not
accommodation parties is clearly erroneous.
./. Point "111

•.

, . : or.e:

Overthrust, and Faust Land

assert that they arp accommodate en :„ a. ' : es "entitled to the
benefits" of tlK
70A-3-606 (Repl. Vc-

*
I-9-. •

*

- -•

§

Although they 10 r.c L aes:r::,r • ..n

"benefits" to wh:.r- ••-•$*• c-Laj.«i ent -i^-e^
Land apparently oe. ., -. • ~ -..hat thei:

. * *-

-o*-- - r ^ s ~ ^nj Faust
*

~-

i

parties gives their* nights against v.r.nstensc* t: * :.t extent that
they have suffered a

IOSS

or uhe Tooele property.

3

The law does

Rule 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
further that briefs that do not comply with the rule "may be
disregarded or stricken. "
The Court also has the discretion to
award attorneys' fees under that rule. Christens on urges the Court
to disregard or strike appellants' brief and to award him a
reasonable attorneys' fee incurred in defending th :i s appeal
4

Appellants' brief, at 3 2,
-7-
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not support their position and this Court should affirm the trial
court7 s dismissal of the cross-claim against Christenson.
The lower court held that "Overthrust was not an
accommodation party in connection with the third loan of
September 28, 1984, as the term accommodation party is used in
the statutes of the State of Utah.,f

(Conclusion of Law No. 8, R.

427. ) 5 Whether Overthrust was an accommodation party is an
issue of fact because it depends on the intent of the parties.
According to this Court in Utah Farm Production Credit
Association v. Watts. 737 P. 2d 154 (Utah 1987),
[w]hether a person is an accommodation party
is a question of intent. In other words, it
is a question of the intention of the person
claimed to be an accommodation party, the
person who would be the accommodated party,
and the person who was the holder of the
paper when the alleged accommodation party
signed.
Id. at 158 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 5

See

Moonev v. GR and Associates, 746 P. 2d 1174, 1177 (Utah App.
1987).

5

The lower court' s holding is in reality a finding of fact
and this Court should not accord it any less deference simply
because it was denominated a conclusion of law. See e. a. , State v.
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd. , 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
6

In their brief, Overthrust and Faust Land cite the Utah
Farm Production Credit case, noting that the Court held that
"whether or not a signor does so as an accommodation is a question
of intent. " (Appellants' brief, at 3 3. ) Although they acknowledge
this rule, appellants failed at trial to introduce any evidence
relating to the intent of the parties. Certainly, they have failed
to marshal any evidence in their brief on appeal.
-8g:\wpl\088\00000p44.W51

In Utah Farm Production Credit Association, this Court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the alleged accommodation
parties on the grounds that issues of fact had been raised
regarding the intent of the parties.

Construing the provisions

of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-4157 this Court described the factors
to be considered in determining whether a person is an
accommodation party, including whether the party received any
benefit from signing the instrument and "whether the signature of
the person claiming to be an accommodation party was necessary
for the other party to receive the consideration given in
exchange for the note."

I^L. at 159 (footnote omitted).

There was no evidence in the present case that the
parties intended that Overthrust would be an accommodation party
when it executed the Trust Deed.

There was no evidence, for

example, that the delivery of the Trust Deed was essential in
order for Capitol Thrift to receive the consideration given for
the $1 million note.

Indeed, this could not have been the case

since the note was made in 1984 and the Trust Deed in 1986.
(Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 434. )

Section 3-415(1) of the UCC defines an accommodation
party as follows:
An accommodation party is one who signs the
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of
lending his name to another party to it.
-9c: \ W D I \ 0 8 8 \ 0 0 0 0 0 O 4 4 . W 5 1

Because the finding that Overthrust was not an
accommodation party is one of fact, appellants had the duty in
their brief to marshal the evidence supporting the findings and
then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court, the evidence insufficient to support the
findings.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).

Their brief does not contain any references to the record
demonstrating that the lower court7 s finding was against the
clear weight of the evidence.

Overthrust had the burden at the

trial of demonstrating that it was an accommodation party.

Utah

Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P. 2d at 158-59.
Appellants failed in that burden.

They failed to introduce the

necessary evidence of the parties' intent at the trial and failed
to marshal any evidence whatsoever in support of their position
in their brief on appeal.

This Court should affirm the trial

court' s holding that Overthrust was not an accommodation party.
B.

As a matter of law, a party who signs a trust
deed can not be an accommodation party to the
maker of a promissory note.
Appellants' appeal should also fail on the additional

ground that Overthrust, as the trustor of the Trust Deed, cannot
be an accommodation maker as a matter of law.

An accommodation

party, according to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(1), "is one who
signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending
his name to another party to it. "

• -10g:\wpl\088\00000p44.W51

(Emphasis added. )

Thus,

Overthrust could only be an accommodation party if it signed an
"instrument" for the purpose of lending its name to another party
to the instrument.

The UCC defines "instrument" as meaning "a

negotiable instrument."

Utah Code Ann. 70A-3-102(1)(e).

Utah

Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 describes the requisites of negotiable
instruments, which are limited to drafts, checks, certificates of
deposit, and notes.

I

A trust deed is not an "instrument" within the meaning
of Section 3-415(1).

A trust deed is nothing more than a means

of pledging real property to secure a debt.

It does not, by

itself, obligate the trustor to make payments and does not render
the trustor liable in the event that the underlying obligation
goes into default.

By signing the Trust Deed in the present

case, Overthrust did not become obligated to Zions First National
Bank in any way.

According to the Official Comment to Section 3-

415(1),

|
Subsection (1) recognizes that an
accommodation party is always a surety (which
includes a guarantor), and it is his only
distinguishing feature. He differs from
other sureties only in that his liability is
on the instrument and he is a surety for
another party to it. . . . An accommodation
maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument
without any resort to his principal . . . .

Official Comment 1 (Emphasis added. ) 8

8

further

In Official Comment 2, the drafters of the UCC stated
that " [t]he essential characteristic is that the
(continued. . . )
-11-
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Overthrust was not a surety of the debt that Capitol
Thrift owed to Zions First National Bank.

After it conveyed the

property, Overthrust had no further connection with the
transaction and owed no debt to the bank.

If Overthrust was not

a surety, it could not have been an accommodation party.

Mere

execution of the Trust Deed for the purpose of pledging property
to secure the debt does not make Overthrust a surety of the debt.
Because Overthrust did not sign or guarantee payment of the note,
it is not an accommodation party.
This legal principal is supported by a careful reading
of Section 3-415(1), which provides that the accommodation party
must sign the same instrument as the person being accommodated.
The statute states that an accommodation party "is one who signs
the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his
name to another party to it. "

(Emphasis added. )

In the present

case, Overthrust did not sign the $1 million note and did not, in
any way, lend its name to Capitol Thrift7 s name.

By signing the

Trust Deed two years after the note was executed, Overthrust
hardly became an accommodation party to the original note.

If it

was not an accommodation party, then it is not entitled to claim
that it is somehow entitled to contribution from Christenson
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l) or any other provision of

8

(. . . continued)
accommodation party is
gratuitously."

a surety,
-12-
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and

not

that

he

has

signed

law. 9

According to White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §

13-15, at 665 (1988 ed. ), Section 3-606 applies only to "any
party to an instrument. "

Overthrust was not a party to the note

and was not obligated under the note in any way.
C.

Overthrust has no standing to sue since it
conveyed the property before the judgment of
foreclosure was entered.
Overthrust has no standing to sue for the loss of the

Tooele property, since it conveyed the property to Faust Land
after executing the Trust Deed.

(Finding of Fact No. 10, R.

433. ) Faust Land was clearly not an accommodation party, since
it did not sign anything and did not lend its name to Capitol
Thrift.

Overthrust appears to be claiming that it is entitled to

a judgment against Christenson for the loss of the Tooele
property even though it no longer owned the property at the time
the judgment of foreclosure was entered.

Overthrust could not

have suffered the loss of the property.
Overthrust introduced no evidence regarding the terms
of the conveyance to Faust Land and did not argue to the court
below that it suffered a loss because of the encumbrance created

y

As argued in Point I of this brief above, appellants'
brief contains no argument relating to their claims against
Christenson.
Christenson' s argument herein represents his best
effort to understand their claims against him and to respond in a
way that will be helpful to the Court.
Without a better
understanding of the nature of appellants' claims, however, he is
left in large part to speculate regarding the legal basis for their
appeal.
-13g:\wpl\088\00000p44. W51

by the recording of the Trust Deed.

Faust Land took the property

subject to the recorded trust deed lien and is in no position to
claim that it suffered a loss because of the encumbrance on the
property at the time of the conveyance.

Overthrust has no

standing to sue for value of the property if it no longer owns
the property.

Faust Land is similarly in an unavailing position,

s:nce it took the property subject to the recorded lien.
CONCLUSION
In their brief, appellants failed to set forth any
understandable legal argument supporting their position against
Christenson.

The lower court' s finding that Overthrust was not

an accommodation party was justified by Overthrust' s failure to
introduce evidence relating to the intent of the parties at the
time the note was executed.

Moreover, as a matter of law

Overthrust, as the trustor of the Trust Deed, could not have been
an accommodation party within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §
70A-3-415(l) since a trust deed is not an "instrument" as defined
in the Uniform Commercial Code.

Christenson urges this Court to

affirm the lower court' s dismissal of the cross-claim against
him.
ADDENDUM
Attached hereto are the following documents:
1.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

2.

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.
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DATED this

/ 1

day of January, 1991.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By

01

R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for defendant/appellee
Richard A. Christenson
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Richard A.
Christenson to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
January, 1991, to the following:
Bruce J. Nelson
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lorin N. Pace
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^ IM-

i

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and
4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General
Partnership, by and through its
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC., a
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ;
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON, JOHN DOES 1 thru 100
and any and all persons who may
claim any right, title or interest
in and to the property which is
the subject of this action,

SUPERSEDING
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 88-087

Defendants,
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST
LAND, a Utah Corporation,
Cross Claim Plaintiffs,
vs.
CAPITOL THRIFT & loan, a Utah
Corporation, and RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON, an individual,
Cross Claim Defendants.

The above-referenced matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled Court,

on Thursday, August 31, 1989. Plaintiffs were represented by their
counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., of the law firm of Allen Nelson
Hardy & Evans.

Defendants Overthrust Oil & Gas Company and Faust

Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel, Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard Christenson were
represented by their counsel, R. Stephen Marshall, Esq., of the
law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

The Court

considered the evidence submitted at trial, heard the testimony of
witnesses,

considered

the

exhibits

offered

into

evidence,

considered the various stipulations of counsel, the arguments
presented

at

trial,

and

miscellaneous

memoranda

and

briefs

submitted concurrently therewith.
Subsequent to trial held on August 31, 1989, this Court made
previous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were
executed by the Court on October 23, 1989.

Such Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law delayed for future determination the issue
of the amount of "boot" to be credited to the Promissory Note which
is the subject of this action.

Pursuant to hearing on Monday,

November 13, 1989, the Court considered such issue.

At such

hearing, the Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel Bruce J.
Nelson, Esq.

Defendants Overthrust Oil and Gas Corporation and

Faust Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel Lorin N. Pace,
Esq.

The Court made certain rulings following the conclusion of

counsels' argument at such hearing.

Subsequently, counsel for the

Plaintiff submitted proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to which objections were made by counsel for
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Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc.

A hearing on such

objections was held by the Court on February 8, 1990.

Bruce J.

Nelson, Esq., was present representing the Plaintiffs.

Lorin N.

Pace, Esq., was present representing Defendants Overthrust and
Faust

Land,

representing

Inc.

R.

Crossclaim

Stephen

Marshall,

Esq.,

Defendants Capitol Thrift

was

present

& Loan and

Richard A. Christenson. At such hearing, the Court considered the
written objections and arguments of counsel, and the Court, having
reviewed the pleadings, documents, and exhibits on file herein,
made certain rulings relating to amendment of the original Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the proposed Supplemental Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the written objections thereto.
Pursuant to such ruling, the Court now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are
intended

to

supersede

any

previous

Findings

and

Conclusions

previously executed by the Court or submitted by the parties for
consideration by the Court.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In early 1983, Zions First National Bank advanced the

first of a series of large loans, principally arranged through
Defendant Richard A. Christenson and affiliates of Bertagnole
Properties, a Utah partnership.
2.

The first loan advanced by Plaintiff Zions First National

Bank was made on March 13, 1983, in the amount of $3,015,000.00 to
Defendant

Bertagnole

Investment

Company

Limited

Partnership,

Defendant Richard A. Christenson, an entity known as Franklin
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Financial, and a Utah limited partnership known as Bertagnole
Properties.
3.
National

The
Bank

second

loan

was made

advanced

on June

by

8,

Plaintiff

Zions

1984, in the

First

amount of

$1,389,418.76 to Defendant Bertagnole Investment Company Limited
Partnership, and a Utah limited partnership known as Bertagnole
Properties.
4.

A third loan, which is the subject of this action, was

made by Plaintiff Zions First National Bank on September 28, 1984,
to Defendant Capitol Thrift & Loan Company
$1,000,000.00 (hereinafter "note").

in the amount of

Such loan was a renewal of

prior loans to Defendant Capitol.

Such loan was guaranteed by

Defendant Richard A. Christenson.

The loan was subsequently

secured by a Trust Deed dated May 26, 1986, on approximately 3,500
acres of undeveloped real property located in Tooele County, State
of Utah (hereinafter "Tooele Property11) .

The loan was further

secured by an interest in property known as the Section 3 5 Property
located in Summit County, and also by a pledge of receivables
formerly owed to Richard A. Christenson, Bruce L. Moesser and
Capitol Thrift & Loan Company (hereinafter "First Security Bank
receivables").
5.

Neither Overthrust nor Faust Land, Inc., were makers on

any of the notes to Plaintiff Zions.
6.
Defendant

As the time of such pledge of property, principals of
Bertagnole

Investment

Company

Limited

Partnership

controlled approximately 80% of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas

4

Company Stock.

Owners of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas Company

were substantially

similar to owners of Defendant

Bertagnole

Investment Company Limited Partnership and Bertagnole Properties,
7.

The Bertagnole partnerships and members of the Bertagnole

family also held substantial interests in Defendant Capitol Thrift
& Loan Company.
8.

Each of the three above-described loans subsequently

became in default.
9.

4447 Associates, a Utah partnership, has acquired a

participation interest in and to Plaintiff Zions First National
Bank's interest to such three Promissory Notes.
10.

Subsequent to the execution of the above-described Trust

Deed, Defendant Overthrust conveyed title to the Tooele Property
to Defendant Faust Land, Inc.

Defendant Faust is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Defendant Overthrust.
11.

Subsequent to the default on the Notes, Plaintiffs Zions

First National

Bank and

4447 Associates

engaged

in extended

settlement negotiations with the obligors on such Notes.
12.

On

September

30,

1987,

following

the

settlement

negotiations, the Plaintiffs and the obligors under the three
Promissory Notes executed a Settlement Agreement.

Such Agreement

was executed between the Plaintiffs, Bertagnole Investment Company
Limited Partnership, Bertagnole Properties, several individuals
from the Bertagnole family, Emanuel A. Floor, and Richard A.
Christenson. The Settlement Agreement contemplated the foreclosure
of various parcels of property securing the three Notes, as well
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as the payment of certain "boot" by the obligors under such Notes,
all in exchange for a contemplated release of liability to the
obligors on such Notes.
13.

Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc., were not

parties to the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
14.

The following "boot" was given to Plaintiffs by one or

more of the note obligors or guarantors at or about the time of the
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement:
a.

10,000,000 shares of restricted stock in Defendant

Overthrust Oil & Gas Company.

The stock was subject to an

option to repurchase for ten cents (100) per share before
September 30, 1993;
b.

Release

of

a

$40,000

First

Trust

Deed

having

priority to the interest of the Plaintiffs in Section 3 5 in
Summit County;
c.

Certain property to be contributed by Richard A.

Christenson, known as the Deer Hollow Property, consisting of
approximately 160 acres of undeveloped real property located
in Morgan County, State of Utah;
d.

A two-thirds interest in 10 acres of real property

located in Davis county, State of Utah, known as the Redwood
Road Property; and
e.

Certain mineral rights associated with other Summit

County property known as the North Park Property.
No attempt was made in the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement
to allocate the boot specifically to any of the three delinquent

6

notes, but was intermingled and credited to the total value of all
three notes.
15.

George

Woodhead

served

as

President

of

Defendant

Overthrust during the periods of time relevant to negotiations and
execution of the Settlement Agreement.

Mr. Woodhead was involved

in the negotiations of the Agreement and had full knowledge of the
terms and contents thereof. Mr. Woodhead also had knowledge of the
implications which would follow the execution of the Settlement
Agreement.
16.

Subsequent to the execution of the Settlement Agreement

but prior to the scheduled foreclosure sales contemplated therein,
it was determined by the parties to such Agreement that the Tooele
County Property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, could not
be foreclosed in the Bankruptcy Court as contemplated under the
Settlement Agreement.
17.
intent

of

After a discussion of options available to effectuate the
the

Settlement

Agreement

without

the

contemplated

bankruptcy sale of the Tooele County Property, George Woodhead, as
President of Defendant Overthrust Oil & Gas Company, agreed to
convey the Tooele County Property to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the
Agreement. He agreed to get permission from the Board of Directors
of Overthrust to convey the property.
18.

No deed was ever given.

Mr. Woodhead subsequently suggested to counsel for the

Plaintiffs that the Plaintiffs should file a friendly foreclosure
suit with the intent being that Defendant Overthrust would not
contest the suit.
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19.

George Woodhead's actions, in indicating a deed would be

executed or in suggesting a friendly foreclosure which would not
be contested, were outside the authority which he had as president
of the corporation and were not binding upon Defendants Overthrust
and Faust Land, Inc.
20.

The

paragraph 4

amount

above,

owing

as

of

on

the

August

third

Note

referenced

31, 1989, was

the

sum

in
of

$1,461,226.70, without deduction for boot settlement amounts and
unearned interest on amounts ruled by the Court to have been paid
on September 30, 1987.
21.

The fair market value of the Tooele Property, pursuant

to testimony of George Woodhead, is $410,000.00.
22.

Plaintiffs have filed a lawsuit against First Security

Bank to seek collection of the First Security Bank receivables but
have not collected any funds from such suit.

First Security Bank

is contesting any liability in such action.
23.

The interest pledged to the Plaintiffs in the Section 35

property had a value of $79,200.00 at the time of the September 30,
1987, Settlement Agreement.
24.

The Shirley Thorpe Trust Deed on the Section 35 property,

which Trust Deed was released

at or about the time of the

September 30, 1987, Agreement, had a value to Plaintiff's interest
in the amount of $21,200.00.
25.

Based upon testimony received at trial, the Court finds

the value of the mineral rights in Summit County to have been the

8
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sum of $450,000.00, as of the date of the September 1987 Settlement
Agreement.
26.

The Court finds the value of the Deer Hollow Property to

have been the sum of $200,000.00 at or about the time of the
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
27.

The Court finds the value of the Redwood Road Property

to have been the sum of 155,000.00 at or about the time of the
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
28.

Pursuant to testimony given at trial, the Court concludes

that the value of the 10,000,000 shares of Overthrust Oil & Gas
Company stock, as of the date of September 1987, was the sum of
$250,000.00.
29.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of

legal counsel to foreclose the property which is the subject of
this action.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement was and is

a valid and binding agreement.
2.

Failure of the Plaintiffs to be allowed to foreclose

against the Tooele Property presently owned by Defendant Faust
Land, Inc., would have constituted a failure of consideration of
the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
3.

The Plaintiffs would be estopped from setting aside the

September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement based on the fact that
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approximately two years have elapsed since its execution,

and the

Plaintiffs have elected to treat it as a valid agreement, have
filed the instant action of foreclosure and undertaken other action
to collect receivables against First Security Bank, and have not
given any notice to set aside such Agreement.
4.

Under

the

terms

of

the

Settlement

Agreement

of

September 30, 1987, Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard A.
Christenson have been released from liability on the three loans
of Zions First National Bank described in the above Findings of
Fact in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof.

did

5.

George Woodhead, as President of Defendant Overthrust,

not

have

authority

to bind

the

Defendant

Overthrust

in

connection with his agreements to convey title to the Tooele County
Property to the Plaintiffs or to suggest an uncontested friendly
foreclosure of such property.

George Woodheadfs actions after the

September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement were outside his authority
as president of Overthrust and are not binding on the corporation.
6.

The Trust Deed on the Tooele County Property, dated

May 20, 1986, and recorded in the office of the Tooele County
Recorder on May 21, 1986, is a valid and binding Trust Deed
supported by adequate consideration of the September 28, 1984, loan
by Plaintiff Zions First National Bank.
7.

Defendant Overthrust received a benefit from the granting

of the Trust Deed by virtue of the fact that the Bertagnole
Partnerships and family members owned a majority of the stock of
Defendant Overthrust.
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8.

Defendant Overthrust was not an accommodation party in

connection with the third loan of September 28, 1984, as the term
accommodation party is used in the statutes of the State of Utah.
9.

The Tooele property Trust Deed should be foreclosed in

the same manner as a mortgage to satisfy the unpaid obligations of
the September 28, 1984 loan. The interests in the Tooele Property
of all Defendants are subordinate to the Trust Deed interest of
the Plaintiffs. There should be no right to a deficiency judgment
against the Defendants following foreclosure of the Trust Deed.
10.

The unpaid amount of the loan should be reduced by the

value of the Section 35 property as set forth herein, the value of
the Shirley Thorpe First Trust Deed on such property as set forth
herein, as well as the value of any other "boot" received at the
time of the Settlement Agreement.
11.

The combination of the value of the Section 3 5 property

($79,200.00) and the value of the released Shirley Thorpe Trust
Deed ($21,200.00), being a total of $100,400.00, should be credited
directly to the amount owing on the Promissory Note.
12.
received

Inasmuch as the Settlement Agreement treated all "boot"
towards the three outstanding

affiliated

with

the

Bertagnole

Family,

loans owed by people
it

is

impossible

to

determine with exactness what boot should be applied to which of
the three loans.

The Court determines that the parties must have

intended a pro rata application of the boot. The obligation owing
on the loan which is the subject of this lawsuit constituted 19.79%
of the total obligation of all three loans.

11

As a result, 19.79%

of th i value of the remaining "boot" should also be applied to the
amount owing on the Note which is the subject of this lawsuit.
13.

The value of the remaining "boot" is:
a.

Summit County water and
mineral rights

$

450,000.00

b.

Deer Hollow Property

200,000.00

c.

Redwood Road Property

155,000.00

d.

Overthrust Stock

250,000.00

TOTAL

$1,055,000.00

As a result, the sum of $208,784.50, constituting 19.79% of the
above total, should be credited

to the amount owing on the

Promissory Note which is the subject of this action.
14.

In summary, the following amounts should be credited to

the Promissory Note which is the subject of this action.
a.

Amount owing as of date of trial

b.

Less Section 35 and
Shirley Thorpe credits
SUBTOTAL

c.

[100,100.001
$1,360,900.00

Less pro rata credit from
remaining "boot"
TOTAL AMOUNT OWING
(as of date of trial)

15.

$1,461,000.00

f^08,784.501
$1,152,115.50

Interest on the foregoing amount should accrue at the

judgment rate of 12% per annum from and after August 31, 1989.
16.

In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiffs should be

required to give credit on the Note which is the subject of this
action, any amounts received from the pending First Security Bank
lawsuit.

Plaintiffs should be required to pursue such lawsuit in
12

good faith and are entitled to pursue the same either through
trial or settlement as they deem appropriate,
17.

Release of the obligors1 liability on the note did not

satisfy the unpaid note, nor release the Trust Deed on the Tooele
Property, because the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement
clearly contemplated such result.
18.

The action

of filing the lawsuit by

Plaintiffs to

liquidate the First Security receivables has not extinguished the
amount owing on the note.
19.
of

Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land, Inc., have a right

subrogation

against

Capitol

Thrift

& Loan

to the extent

Defendant Overthrust has shown it would be damaged by the expected
foreclosure as may be subsequently

determined

by the Court.

Defendant Overthrust has no right of subrogation against Defendant
Defendant Overthrustfs Crossclaim against Defendant

Christenson.
Christenson

should

be

dismissed.

After

completion

of

the

foreclosure, Defendants Overthrust and Faust may petition this
Court for an additional hearing on damages.

Such Defendants1

claim for attorneys fees may be determined and considered at such
later hearing.
20.

Bertagnole, Capitol Thrift & Loan, and Overthrust were

all separate entities and were not agents of each other.
21.

The foreclosure of the Tooele Property should not be

delayed pending a completion of the lawsuit against First Security
Bank.
22.

This

authorizing

the

Court

should

Sheriff

enter

of Tooele
13

a

Decree

County

of

Foreclosure

to proceed

with a

Sheriff f s Sale, in accordance with the law and practice of this
Court and the statutes of the State of Utah, of the real property
located in Tooele County which is the subject of this action.

Any

amount received at the sale, or the amount of any final credit bid
by the Plaintiffs, should reduce the amount owing on the Note as
set forth in paragraph 4 above.
23.

However, any monies received from the net receivables in

the First Security Bank lawsuit (after crediting litigation costs,
fees and expenses) should also be applied to any residual amount
owing on the Note which is the subject of this action.
event

net

receivables

create

a

surplus

over

and

In the

above

any

remaining amount owing on the Note, the same shall be tendered
into Court and any parties who may claim an interest in and to
such

surplus may

seek appropriate

legal

relief

to

obtain

any

amounts to which they may be properly entitled.
24.

In addition to the amounts owing on the note as set

forth above, Plaintiffs are entitled to an attorneys fee in this
matter in the amount of $5,000.00.
DATED this

J °

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HoSerF.Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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Brkce J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Overthrust
and Faust Land, Inc.

'lA l ^ o / u ^
R. Stephjpn Marshall, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
Capitol Thrift & Loan and
Richard A. Christenson
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

9

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK and
44 47 ASSOCIATES, a Utah General
Partnership, by and through its
General Partner, ROBERT D. KENT,
Plaintiffs,
vs,
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION
a Utah Corporation; BERTAGNOLE
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah Limited
Partnership; FAUST LAND, INC., a
Utah Corporation; JOSEPH L. PENTZ;
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN; RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON, JOHN DOES 1 thru 100
and any and all persons who may
claim any right, title or interest
in and to the property which is
the subject of this action,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

M % 2% % % 'I
Civil No. 88-087

Defendants,
OVERTHRUST OIL & GAS CORPORATION
a Utah Corporation, and FAUST
LAND, a Utah Corporation,
Cross Claim Plaintiffs,
vs.
CAPITOL THRIFT & LOAN, a Utah
Corporation, and RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON, an individual,
Cross Claim Defendants.

The above-referenced matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled Court,

\j\J0 ^4 #

on Thursday, August 31, 1989. Plaintiffs were represented by their
counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., of the law firm of Allen Nelson
Hardy & Evans.

Defendants Overthrust Oil & Gas Company and Faust

Land, Inc., were represented by their counsel, Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
Defendants Capitol Thrift & Loan and Richard Christensen were
represented by their counsel, R. Stephen Marshall, Esq., of the
law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.

The Court,

having listened to the evidence submitted at trial, having heard
the testimony of witnesses and considered the exhibits offered into
evidence, and the Court having considered the various stipulations
of

counsel, arguments

presented

at

trial, and

miscellaneous

memoranda and briefs submitted concurrently therewith, and the
Court having previously entered its Superseding Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Court being thereby fully advised
in the premises, and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The real property located in Tooele County, Utah, more

particularly described on the attached Exhibit "A", is security
under a Trust Deed dated May 20, 1986, for an unpaid debt owed to
the Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,157,115.50 as of August 31,
1989, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of 12% per
annum, with a per diem of $380.42. Such amount consists of unpaid
principal, accrued interest, an attorneys fee of $5,000.00, and a
credit for payments applied to such loan in connection with a
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement.
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2.

The foregoing described property, or such portion thereof

as may be sufficient to pay the foregoing amounts and the accruing
costs herein and expenses of sale, shall be sold at public auction
by the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, in the manner
prescribed by law for the foreclosure of mortgages.

The Sheriff,

out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs,
disbursements, and commissions, and then pay to Plaintiffs, or to
their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action,
then the amount owing to Plaintiffs for principal, interest, and
costs, or so much of such sums as such proceeds will pay, and the
surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk
of this Court subject to this Court's further order.
3.

The interest of all Defendants are subordinate to the

interest of the Plaintiffs in the property subject to the Trust
Deed.
4.
shall

All persons having an interest in the subject premises

have

the

right, upon

producing

satisfactory

proof

of

interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for
such redemption.

From and after the expiration of the period of

redemption as provided by law, all Defendants and each of them, and
all persons claiming by, through, or under them, and any other
person or entity, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all
right, title, interest, and estate in and to the subject premises
and from and after the delivery of the Sheriff's Deed to the
subject

premises, the

possession thereof.

grantee

named

therein

shall

be

given

5.

No

deficiency

judgment

shall

be

hereafter

awarded

inasmuch as the obligors on the note have beeen released from
liability or were otherwise discharged in bankruptcy.
6.
property

Defendant Faust Land, Inc., as current owner of the
in Tooele, is entitled to possession of the subject

premises and all rights pertaining thereto during the period of
redemption as provided by law.
7*

The Crossclaims of Defendants Overthrust and Faust Land,

Inc., are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as to
Defendant Richard A. Christenson.
8.

As between Defendants Overthrust and Christenson, each

party shall bear their own costs and fees herein.

The issue of

fees of Defendants Overthrust and Faust against Capitol Thrift &
Loan

under

any

subrogation

claim

is

reserved

for

future

determination by the Court.
DATED this <S

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

y?

7^^-

omer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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:uce J, Nelson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

torin N. Pace, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Overthrust
and Faust Land, Inc.

R. Stiphten Marshall, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
Capitol Thrift & Loan and
Richard A. Christenson
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EXHIBIT "A"
PARCEL NO, 1:
Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4, Northwest 1/4, Lots 2 and 3,
Section 27, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 249.86 acres;
The part of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 17, Township 4 South,
Range 5 West, lying southerly of Division Line, containing 10
acres;
That part of Section 21, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, lying southerly of Division Line, containing 480 acres;
North 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4, Southeast 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4,
Section 29, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 120 acres;
That part of Section 22, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, lying
southerly of Division Line, containing 619.16 acres.
North 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4, Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4,
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 120 acres;
That part of the South 1/2, Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 5
West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying south of Division Line, containing
58.80 acres;
North 1/2, Section 28, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 320 acres.
That part of the East 1/2, Section 20, Township 4 South, Range 5
West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying southerly of Division Line,
containing 310 acres.
That part of the West 1/2 of the West 1/2, Section 14, Township 4
South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, lying southerly from
Division Line, less 15 acres to Ana Conda containing 45 acres.
Also that portion of the following described tracts lying Northerly
from the Division Line particularly described as follows, and
located in Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
Beginning at the highest ridge line of the West Boundary of the
Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4, Section 17 and running in a
Southeasterly direction along said ridge line to a peak
approximately in the center of Northeast 1/4 Section 21 which peak
is shown on a map prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior
Geological Survey, covering Stockton, Utah, as being 6543 feet high
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and running thence North 62°30f East 8976 feet, more or less, to
a point on the East boundary of the West 1/2 of the West 1/2,
Section 14 which final point is approximately on the East-West
quarter section line,
PARCEL NO. 2:
North 1/2, Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 320 acres.
PARCEL NO. 3:
South 1/2, Section 35, Township 6 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 320 acres.
PARCEL NO. 4:
East 1/2 of the West 1/2 of Section 15, Township 8 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres.
PARCEL NO. 5:
East 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4, Northwest 1/4, Section 21, Township
8 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 20 acres.
PARCEL NO. 6:
East 1/2 of the East 1/2, Section 9, Township 8 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres.
PARCEL NO. 7:
East 1/2 of the West 1/2, Section 12, Township 8 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres.
PARCEL NO. 8:
North 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 8,
Township 6 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 2 0
acres.
PARCEL NO. 9:
South 1/2, Section 36, Township 3 North, Range 11 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 320 acres.
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